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Refugee Law or Refugee Politics? The Varied Levels of China’s Hospitality
Towards North Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese Refugees
Kailey Ibsen
有朋自远访来，不亦乐乎！
To have friends coming from afar, is it not a delight!1

A landscape of rich flora, patterned by rice terraces stretching from Yunnan Province in
the southwest of China into Myanmar’s northeast region, is home to an ethnic minority group,
known as the “Kachin” in Myanmar and the “Jingpo” in China.2 Beginning in 2011, groups of
Kachins, displaced from their villages due to war in the Kachin State of Myanmar, have fled to
Yunnan Province, where the Chinese government has set up several camps for internationally
displaced persons (IDPs).

3

However, some Kachins have been turned away by Chinese

authorities at the border or ordered to leave villages where they were given shelter by Chinese
nationals. 4 To aid these displaced individuals, Mr. Zhang, a Chinese human rights activist,
travels across the Myanmar-China border at unsecured, unpatrolled points to deliver food and
supplies to the Kachin. His past efforts to raise awareness on human rights issues in China have
led him into trouble with Chinese authorities.5 In 2003, Mr. Zhang was jailed for four months
after writing about China’s persecution of house churches.6 However, as of February 2013, his
subsequent humanitarian efforts along the border of Myanmar have been overlooked by Chinese

1

This is a famous Confucius quote.
This paper will focus on the experience of Kachin people, who inhabit the Kachin State of Myanmar.
3
Diantan & Yingjiang, The Kachin Dilemma, The Economist (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571189-over-border-kachin-conflict-causes-headaches-china-kachindilemma.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
“House churches” in China are comprised of members who worship privately together in their homes. Only
monitored and regulated state-sanctioned churches are allowed to openly operate in China. Zhaohui Hong,
Protecting and Striving for the Rights to Religious Freedom: Case Studies on the Protestant House Churches in
China, 29 J. of Third World Studies 1, 249-261 (2012).
2

1

authorities. 7 Mr. Zhang’s experiences represent a familiar narrative of individuals who have
come to the aid of refugees along the borders of China. 8 This article will examine China’s
response to three different refugee groups that have sought protection within its borders: North
Koreans, Vietnamese, and Kachins.
For over twenty years, North Korean citizens have been crossing the border into China to
escape famine and political, social, and religious persecution. Although China is a party to the
United Nation’s 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
(hereinafter “Refugee Convention”), its treatment of refugees that have fled into China from
North Korea has been completely inconsistent with its obligations under this treaty. 9 China’s
policy is to classify North Koreans escaping the deadly, oppressive rule of the North Korean
regime as “economic migrants,” rather than “refugees,” and to completely repatriate North
Koreans who illegally enter Chinese territory.

10

Collaborated efforts to secretly pass North

Korean refugees through China into Southeast Asia have become known as the “new
underground railroad.” 11 Several Americans living in China have been caught aiding North
Korean refugees and have been deported or sentenced to serve jail time in China.12
Historically, China has not been so harsh in its dealings with all refugees that have
arrived at its borders. In the 1970s, Vietnamese citizens fleeing war and ethnic discrimination
arrived in China and nearly a quarter of a million people were offered refuge by the Chinese

7

DIANTAN, supra note 2.
See generally, MELANIE KIRKPATRICK, ESCAPE FROM NORTH KOREA: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
ASIA’S UNDERGROUND RAILROAD (Encounter Books 2012).
9
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, as amended
by the 1967 New York Protocol, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 6 I.L.M. 78 [Refugee Convention].
10
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 147.
11
Id. at 2.
12
See id.
8

2

government. 13 In contrast to the experience of North Koreans in China, these Vietnamese
refugees were not only welcomed and provided with food and temporary shelter, but the Chinese
government even sent ships into the South China Sea to pick them up.14 Most of these people
were Vietnamese citizens, but ethnically Chinese. Decades later, many Vietnamese refugees and
their children continue to reside in China, primarily in Guangxi Province.15
Officially, the Chinese government maintains that neither Kachins nor North Koreans in
China are refugees, but rather North Koreans are illegal economic migrants, and Kachins are
temporarily displaced people visiting family and friends in Yunnan.16 However, it is evident that
China has been more accommodating to Kachin refugees than it has been to North Korean
refugees, despite the stronger case for granting refugee status to individuals fleeing North Korea
under the Refugee Convention. While China has not practiced a policy of total repatriation of
Kachin people, there have been reports of arbitrary repatriation or denied entry of Kachins into
China. Additionally, China has taken a much stronger hand in prosecuting those who aid North
Koreans in China under its domestic penal law. On the other hand, Vietnamese refugees that fled
to China in the late 1970s were granted asylum.17 Despite the current disparity in treatment of
North Koreans and Kachins, neither group has experienced the welcome and long-term stay
offered to Vietnamese refugees several decades ago.
Examining China’s approach to North Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese refugees against
one another, begins to suggest that China will interpret its obligations under international treaties
Tom Lam, The Exodus of Hoa Refugees from Vietnam and their Settlement in Guangxi: China’s Refugee
Settlement Strategies, 13 J. of Refugee Studies 4, 374-390 (2000).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 147. ‘No Assistance’ for Kachin Refugees, Radio Free Asia (June 26, 2012),
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/burma/refugees-06262012165817.html.
17
Xiaorong Han, Exiled to the Ancestral Land: The Resettlement Stratification and Assimilation of the Refugees
from Vietnam in China, 10 Int’l. J. of Asian Studies 1, 25-46 (Jan. 2013), at 28.
13
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depending on what horse it has in the race. Vietnamese refugees that were subject to ethnic
discrimination and persecution in Vietnam were most likely properly granted asylum in China,
even though China was not yet a signatory party to the Refugee Convention at that time. North
Koreans fleeing into China have a strong case for refugee status under the Refugee Convention
and warranting protection under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter “Torture Convention”).18 Human rights groups
have argued that Kachin people in Yunnan Province, China fulfill the U.N.’s definition of
refugee. 19 However, the circumstances surrounding the Kachin dilemma do not provide as
compelling a case for refugee status as does the plight of North Koreans in China. The Chinese
government has nevertheless departed from its practice of complete repatriation and has
established four temporary camps for Kachins in Yunnan Province, though not all Kachins are
granted refuge in the camps, as some have been denied refuge in China and transported by bus
back into Myanmar.20 There have not been any reports suggesting what criteria local authorities
have used in Yunnan Province, when determining which refugees should be denied entry to
China or forcibly returned to Myanmar. The national government in Beijing has not taken a
substantial amount of direct involvement in the situation and enforcement by local officials
appears to be arbitrary.21 Even so, the Kachin people and the Chinese activists providing aid to
them have received different treatment than North Korean refugees and their supporters.
Although many Chinese people have provided shelter to undocumented Kachins and
18

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, 10 Dec.
1984.
19
ISOLATED IN YUNNAN: KACHIN REFUGEES FROM BURMA IN CHINA’S YUNNAN PROVINCE 25
(Human Rights Watch June 2012), available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/06/25/isolated-yunnan.
20
Kachin refugees from Myanmar face food and water shortages at makeshift camps in China, UNHCR Refugees
Daily (June 27, 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=463ef21123&id=4febee2a5. Kate
Hodal, Burma steps up military offensive against Kachin rebels, The Guardian (Jan. 01, 2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/14/burma-military-offensive-kachin-rebels.
21
David Cohen, China’s Myanmar Problem, The Diplomat (Jan. 17, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/chinapower/chinas-myanmar-problem/.
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humanitarian workers have illegally crossed the border to bring Kachin people supplies, there
have not been any reports of detention of these individuals by Chinese authorities.
This paper will present the historic background and current relevant factors of North
Korean, Kachin, and Vietnamese refugees in China, followed by an analysis of economic and
political interests that likely account for China’s differing treatment of each refugee situation.
Part one will discuss the plight that ordinary people face in North Korea, China’s strict
repatriation policy towards North Korean refugees, and a secret network of aid workers that help
them to pass through China to safety. Part two will explore the background of refugees that
entered into Southern China from Vietnam in the mid to late 1970s and the Chinese
government’s active role in aiding them. In part three, this paper will examine the current
conflict in the Kachin State of Myanmar, ethnic Kachin people that have fled to Yunnan
Province, China, and the treatment of Chinese nationals that have been providing them with food
and shelter.
After exploring the circumstances of each region, part four will discuss China’s current
political and economic interests in North Korea and Myanmar and hypothesis as to the reasons
why Vietnamese refugees received such a distinctly warmer welcome in China. It is the opinion
of this paper that the Chinese ethnicity of the Vietnamese refugees that arrived in China in the
1970s, as well as the deteriorating relations between China and Vietnam at that time, were major
factors in the accommodating treatment they received from the Chinese government. China’s
differing treatment of North Korean refugees and ethnic Kachins may be explained, in part, by
the influential role that the Kachin Independence Organization plays in the security of Chinese
investments in the Kachin State and the fact that the average North Korean citizen exercises little
to no clout in Chinese government policy decisions. In order to protect its economic interests in
5

Myanmar, it is pragmatic for China to encourage peace in the Kachin State of Myanmar and
remain somewhat neutral between the Kachin people and the Myanmar government, due to the
power that the Kachin still maintain in a region where China has made many investments. As
North Korea’s only ally, Beijing prioritizes preserving friendly relations with the North Korean
regime. Therefore, complying with its agreement with the North Korean government to repatriate
“defectors” is important in order to maintain stability on the North Korea-China border.
Finally, part five of this paper will make recommendations for China’s future course of
action with refugees from North Korea and Myanmar. While China’s differing approaches in the
two regions may serve its economic and geopolitical interests, they are contrary to the requests
and mandates of the United Nations and have resulted in uneven enforcement of China’s
domestic law. It is the opinion of this paper that in order to meet its international legal
obligations, China must end its repatriation policy of North Korean refugees and comply with the
United Nation’s request to grant Kachin people temporary legal status in China, until they are
able to return to their homes. However, while it is plausible that China may accordingly
accommodate Kachin refugees, it is strongly unlikely that there will be any modification to
China’s repatriation policy of North Korean refugees without significant pressure from the
international community. Imposing heavy pressure on China may not be a current priority of the
international community, given the greater danger posed by the North Korean government’s
nuclear program and increasingly aggressive posture. If China were to decide to grant asylum to
North Koreans, its experience with Vietnamese refugees would serve as a useful model for how
to deal with a refugee population.

Part I: Fleeing North Korea

6

After World War II, political differences divided the Korean Peninsula and leader Kim Il
Sung built a communist nation in the north based on the Soviet model.22 The new North Korea
was supported by China and the Soviet Union. 23 Yet after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev, who
opposed Stalinism and warned against cult personalities like Kim Il Sung, came to power.24 The
changing political climate in the Soviet Union prompted Kim Il Sung to purge all who opposed
his rule from the Communist Party.25 Although North Korea initially experienced a period of
economic success, the economy eventually stalled and the country became largely supported by
subsidized supplies from the Soviet Union.26 Crisis set in when the Soviet Union collapsed and
famine struck North Korea.27 After the fall of the Soviet Union, China remained North Korea’s
only ally.28 The death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, followed by a series of natural disasters, further
exacerbated the food shortage and many starving North Koreans began to flee into China.29
During this time, approximately 5% percent of the population died.30
Today, severe food rationing, hunger, and numerous human rights violations persist in
North Korea. The government has devised a discriminatory food policy to deal with the food
shortage, which allocates food rations on the basis of social standing.31 The country’s regions are
organized by social castes and rations are distributed accordingly. 32 When food rations are
particularly scarce, the region in the northwest, which is inhabited by one of the lowest ranking
22

GLYN FORD, NORTH KOREA ON THE BRINK: STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL 2 (Pluto Press 2007).
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 113.
27
Id.
28
James Seymour, China and the International Asylum Regime: The Case of the North Korean Refugees, East Asian
Institute, Columbia University 1-9 (2000).
29
Id.
30
MARC NOLAND, WITNESS TO TRANSFORMATION: REFUGEE INSIGHTS INTO NORTH KOREA 1
(Peterson Institute for International Economics 2011).
31
Richard Parks, Shining a Light on North Korea’s Human Rights Crisis, The Diplomat (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://thediplomat.com/the-editor/2012/12/12/shinning-a-light-on-north-koreas-human-rights-crisis/.
32
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 25.
23
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social castes, is sometimes denied rations entirely.33 The caste system also determines whether
an individual can attend university and what type of job they can obtain.34 In depth academic
scholarship on the plight of North Korean refugees is scare, due to the country’s isolation, and
most published information about refugees that have escaped comes from media and government
sources.35 Stories of the North Korean government’s abuse of its citizens have been provided to
the international community from refugees that have successfully escaped to Southeast Asia,
South Korea, or western countries. Not all refugees are willing to tell their story, for fear that
their families in North Korea will be punished, but those that do share their stories provide
crucial information to understanding this out-migration. 36 Many people in North Korea,
including political dissents, are arbitrarily imprisoned in harsh conditions.37 These circumstances,
along with many other injustices, have caused North Koreans to flee to China, where they hope
to find food and some relief.
When North Koreans first flee their country, they enter China through Jilin Province in
the northeast of China, a region referred to in Mandarin as “Dongbei.”38 Jilin Province has a
large population of ethnic Koreans, who are Chinese nationals. North Korean citizens in Jilin
Province are individuals connected with and trusted by the North Korean government or refugees
that are hiding from authorities, passing through China, or sold as brides to Chinese men. A
group of these government supported individuals attends Northeast Normal University in

33

KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 148.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 25.
35
Elim Chan and Andreas Schloenhardt, North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law, 19 Int’l. J. on
Refugee Law 2, 215-245 (2007).
36
Id.
37
PARKS, supra note 30.
38
A direct translation of “Dongbei” in Mandarin Chinese is eastnorth. Cardinal directions in Mandarin are described
in the reverse order of directions in English.
34
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Changchun, a large city in Jilin Province. 39 Besides their North Korean citizenship, other
information about their identities is unknown to most, if not all, students and they generally
travel together in public and avoid social interaction with other students. Other than the
individuals who receive permission from the North Korean government to travel to China, most
North Koreans in Jilin Province do not have legal status in China and are considered to be
“defectors” by the North Korean government. 40 The worst outcome for those fleeing North
Korea is to become discovered by Chinese authorities and sent back to North Korea. As a result
of China’s strict repatriation policy, many North Korean refugees that do not continue on to a
third country are pushed underground.41 This leaves them vulnerable to blackmail, abuse, and
sexual exploitation.42 North Korean women are also vulnerable to the dangers of the illegal bride
market in China. Due to a gender imbalance, human trafficking of women as “brides” has
become a serious problem in China.43 Sadly, a market for North Korean “brides” endures, in part,
by the fact that their families will probably never come looking for them and the women
themselves may fear deportation to North Korea more than remaining with their captors.
Refugees that are successful in passing through China into Southeast Asia often do so
with the help of a disjointed network of humanitarian workers, collectively known as the
“underground railroad.” 44 This network is partly comprised of American and South Korean

39

This information is based on personal encounters, while living in Jilin Province, China and attending Northeast
Normal University as a Chinese language student.
40
SEYMOUR, supra note 28.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
The gender imbalance of the Chinese population consists of a disproportionate number of men to women. The
most popular theory on the cause of this imbalance is China’s One Child Policy and the desire of couples, based on
traditional Chinese values and economic concerns, to have a son. In some Chinese cities, both the desire to have a
son and the restrictions of the One Child policy are relaxing, but the policy has resulted in a serious shortage of
prospective brides for many young Chinese men now coming of age. Richard Lehmann, Why China is Finally
Abandoning its One Child Policy, Forbes (March 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/2013/03/28/whychina-is-finally-abandoning-its-one-child-policy.
44
See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7.
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based NGOs, as well as Chinese churches that provide shelter to North Korean refugees, arrange
transportation to their next destination, and connect them with individuals who can help them in
the next segment of their journeys.45 Many refugees that successfully pass through China report
that they were told early in their journey to “look for a building with a cross on it.” 46 After
connecting with this network in Jilin Province, successful refugees often make their way to
Kunming, a city in the southwest province of Yunnan. From there, a typical journey continues
into Laos and across the Mekong River to Thailand. Once in Thailand, North Korean refugees
often go to the South Korean Embassy or the U.S. Embassy to seek political asylum. While this
is the typical experience of successful refugees, many people that flee North Korea are not as
lucky.

Protecting North Koreans under UN Conventions
China has not fulfilled its obligations as a signatory party to international treaties that set
out to protect the rights and safety of endangered people, such as those fleeing from North Korea
to China. China has been a party to the Refugee Convention since 1982. Under the Refugee
Convention, a refugee is defined as a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.” 47 Parties agree to a policy of ‘non-refoulement,’ under which a state is
prohibited from forcibly returning refugees if their “life or freedom would be threatened on
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social or political

45

KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 40.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 41.
47
REFUGEE CONVENTION, supra note 9, at art. 33.
46

10

opinion.”48 This policy of non-refoulment requires states to provide “access to fair and effective
procedures for determining status and protection needs” before rejecting asylum seekers at the
nation’s border.49
Another treaty that China has violated in its treatment of North Korean refugees is the
Convention against Torture (hereinafter “Torture Convention”), which China ratified in 1988. It
undertakes to prevent torture and inhumane treatment of people around the world.50 Article 3 of
the Torture Convention prevents signatory parties from returning or extraditing a person to a
state in which there are substantial grounds for believing that the individual would be in danger
of being tortured.51 Torture is defined in Article 1 as:
Any act by which severe pain, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person,
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions.52
Additionally, Article 10 of the Torture Convention requires signatory governments to provide
training on the prohibition of torture to all levels of law enforcement.53 Although these treaties
require signatory nations to take appropriate measures to protect human rights, China’s

48

Id. at art. 33.
UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, UNHCR (November 1997),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/438c6d972.html.
50
PETER BURNS, CHINA AND THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 3 (Int'l Ctr. for Criminal Law Reform & Criminal
Justice Policy 2005).
51
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, 10
December 1984.
52
Id. art. 1.
53
Id. art 10.
49
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constitution is silent on the domestic implementation of international treaties. 54 The Chinese
government did, however, state in a 1991 report that as soon as the government agrees to an
international treaty, it becomes effective in China and that the Torture Convention is effective in
China. 55 Despite this comment, China’s agreement with North Korea to repatriate any North
Korean, is clearly not in conformity with China’s obligations under the treaty, as North Koreans
face grave danger when returning to North Korea. Besides this agreement, Chinese domestic law
does not expressly call for deportation of all refugees, and even if it were to, China’s Civil
Procedure Law provides that when there is a conflict between an international treaty and Chinese
Law, the international treaty will govern, besides where China has expressly declared
reservations.56 Although China has made no such declarations of reservation in regard to Articles
1 or 3 of the Torture Convention, its repatriation of undocumented North Koreans is clearly a
violation of these articles.
There are several valid legal grounds for finding that returning North Koreans to their
home country would violate the Torture Convention and for granting North Koreans in China
with refugee status under the UN’s definition. These include the North Korean government’s
persecution of any religious beliefs, severe suppression of speech, arbitrary imprisonment and
torture of political dissidents, the organization of citizens into social castes, discriminatory
distribution of food rations, and the persecution of any citizen that leaves the country.57 Despite
these circumstances, China does not recognize any undocumented North Koreans as refugees
and follows a strict policy of repatriation of these undocumented individuals. China’s policy of

54

Sanzhuan Guo, Implementation of Human Rights Treaties by Chinese Courts: Problems and Prospects, 8 Chinese
J. of Int’l Law 1 (2009) 161-179.
55
Id.
56
Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 260, 31 Aug. 2012.
57
ROBERTA COHEN, CHINA’S REPATRIATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 2-3 (Brookings Institute
2012).
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repatriation of North Koreans began in the 1960s, but an influx of North Koreans into China did
not become a real problem until the Chinese economy took off in the mid-1990s and severe
famine struck North Korea.58 Interestingly, before this time, most migrants into Northeast China
were well-nourished males. 59 Although an agreement between China and North Korea had
already been made to return those that illegally crossed over the border, China did not make
strong enforcement efforts against these early migrants.60 This may be because the amount of
migrants was small enough that the Chinese government did not receive the same level of
pressure from the North Korean government or because China was not as concerned about a
North Korean population in Northeast China until the influx became more significant. In fact,
until recently, Chinese domestic law did not even provide a formal definition of a refugee. In
2012, China’s Exit-Entry Law was revised to include recognition of refugee status in Article 46,
stating that,
Foreign nationals applying for a refugee status, during the period of
identification of their refugee status, stay in China on the basis of a temporary
identification issued by the public security authority; and those identified as
refugees may stay or reside in China on the basis of a refugee identification issued
by the public security authority.61
China has defended against accusations that it has violated its obligations to receive
North Korean refugees by asserting that individuals who have illegally crossed into China from
North Korea are not in fact “refugees,” but rather “economic migrants.”62 This categorization
grossly minimizes the human rights violations by the North Korean regime against the North
Korean people. The Chinese government has argued that its repatriation of undocumented North
58

KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 28. (Before the early 1990s, there was not a huge incentive for North Koreans to
risk their lives fleeing to China because the standard of living in China was not significantly greater than in North
Korea.)
59
SEYMOUR, supra note 28.
60
Id.
61
Exit-Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 46, 30 June 2012.
62
Melanie Kirkpatrick, China Vs. North Korea’s Refugees, Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 2013 at A. 15.
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Koreans is analogous to the United States’ deportation of illegal immigrants from Mexico. 63
However, among the many distinguishing factors between undocumented North Koreans in
China and undocumented Mexicans in the United States is that upon returning to North Korea,
citizens would be criminally charged for fleeing.64 In 2010, the North Korean Ministry of Public
Security issued a decree calling defection a crime of treachery.65 Any crime of an individual in
North Korean is payable by three generations of the criminal’s family.66 The punishment is based
on a theory of ‘collective responsibility’ and sets out to ‘cleanse’ North Korea of its opponents.
The approach is suspected to have its roots in a statement made in 1972 by Kim Il Sung that,
“Factionalists or enemies of class, whoever they are, their seed must be eliminated through three
generations.”67 Another counterpoint to China’s “economic migrant” defense is that the United
Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (hereinafter “UNHCR”) provides that where a
country’s economic measures result in the destruction of a population’s economic existence, the
victims may become refugees upon leaving their country.68
Additionally, a strong argument can be made that China’s repatriation policy of North
Koreans violates the Torture Convention. Under the Torture Convention, signatory states are
prohibited from returning individuals to a country where there are substantial ground for
believing that the individual will be inflicted with severe physical or mental pain for the purpose
of punishing him for an act he has committed.69 It is well documented that individuals repatriated

63

Id.
COHEN, supra note 44, at 2.
65
Id.
66
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 3.
67
CHAN, supra note 27, at 219.
68
Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees F.63, 1976.
69
TORTURE CONVENTION, supra note 47.
64
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back to North Korea are punished by death or placed into labor camps.70 One such refugee, who
now lives in the United States, spoke at a conference in Washington, D.C. and described his time
in a North Korean prison.71 He said that one morning an inmate was too weak to get out of bed
after he was beaten all night by the prison guards. His fellow inmates were ordered to bury him
alive in the woods.72

Helping North Koreans
Although the Chinese government formally stated on December 1, 1995 that, “UNHCR
personnel may at all times have unimpeded access to refugees and to the sites of UNHCR
projects in order to monitor all phases of their implementation,” the UNHCR has not been able to
do so in the case of North Korean refugees.73 International aid groups have also been denied
access to monitor the situation near the North Korean border. 74 In 2006, a report from Time
Magazine suggested Chinese authorities had increased their efforts in northeast cities to break up
networks that seek to aid North Koreans in passing through China or providing them with
shelter. 75 Generally, small gestures of providing food to undocumented North Koreans are
ignored by local Chinese authorities, but any involvement in aiding North Koreans to pass
through China via the “underground railroad” is a serious criminal offense. 76 The New York
Times has described a trend of “gradually hardening Chinese posture" toward those who aid

70

See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 7.
72
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 8.
73
United Nations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and China Agreement on the upgrading of the
UNHCR Mission in the People’s Republic of China to UNHCR branch office in the People’s Republic of China, 1
December 1995.
74
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 8.
75
Bill Powell, Long Walk to Freedom, Time, May 01, 2006, available at:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2056132,00.html.
76
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 43.
71
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North Koreans.77 This increased enforcement might be due, in part, to the occurrence of North
Korean soldiers fleeing into China.78
In December 2006, three Americans were arrested by Chinese authorities, for helping
North Korean refugees to reach the United States Consulate in Shenyang, a large city in Jilin
Province.79 They worked for an organization called LiNK, which set out to help North Korean
refugees pass through the “underground railroad” to freedom and safety. 80 One of the three
arrested was the group’s executive director, Adrian Hong, who had previously aided in the
escape of the first North Koreans to receive political asylum in the United States.81 A few days
before the group was arrested, they executed the beginning of a plan to bring six North Koreans,
who had been hiding in the Chinese border town of Yanji, to the American Consulate.82 This was
the same way Hong had successfully aided two North Koreans escape a few months earlier and
he was confident that a Foreign Service officer at the Consulate would help him to do so again.83
Yet while strategically positioned in a KFC restaurant in Shenyang, just down the street from the
U.S. Consulate, the plan began to unravel.84 The group’s cover was blown when Hong called the
Consulate, speaking with intentionally vague language, and a Foreign Service officer replied in
specific detail that he should instead bring the North Koreans to UNHCR in Beijing.85 Hong and
the other two Americans were arrested by Chinese authorities, who heard the conversation
through their electronic surveillance.86 They were transported to a jail in Beijing, where they
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were held for a week before being deported to the United States.87 The three LiNK employees
were lucky because they could have served many years in Chinese prison under Article 318 of
China’s Criminal Law. Article 318 criminalizes the act of assisting a person to illegally cross the
national borders of China.88 Aiding one individual holds a sentence of two to seven years, but
additional circumstances, such as acting as a ringleader or repeating the offense, yield sentences
from seven years to life in prison.89 Adrian Hong was particularly lucky, as he repeatedly acted
as a ringleader to bring North Koreans to the U.S. Consulate. Fortunately for Hong, it appears
that his earlier actions of aiding North Koreans went undiscovered by Chinese authorities at the
time of his deportation.
Other individuals that have aided North Korean individuals in China, including Steven
Kim, a Korean-American businessman, have not been as lucky as the LiNK employees. Steven
Kim left his work in the United States, when he felt a spiritual calling to go to China and assist
refugees fleeing from the severe North Korean regime.90 After being arrested in connection with
helping North Koreans to pass through China on the “underground railroad,” Kim was convicted
under Article 318 and served five years in a Chinese prison.91 After serving out his sentence, he
returned to New York, where he now operates an organization called 318 Partners, named after
the Chinese Law upon which he was prosecuted, to help raise awareness on the situation of
North Korean refugees.92

Part III: Vietnamese in China
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In the late 1970sChina granted asylum to approximately 270,000 Vietnamese citizens
fleeing war and ethnic discrimination. 93 When U.S. forces moved out of Vietnam after the
Vietnam War, the new Vietnamese government began confiscating businesses and moving
people from urban areas to farmland. 94 Much of this weight fell on the ethnic Chinese in
Vietnam. 95 In 1978, sensing the danger of an open conflict between the Chinese and the
Vietnamese and feeling discriminated against, many Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity began to
flee to China.96 Many became fishers, farmers, and factory works and still reside in China.97 The
Vietnamese refugees were predominantly from the Han ethnic group, which makes up the
majority of China’s population.98 In China, the names used to describe these refugees, such as
Yuenan huaqiao (meaning “overseas Chinese from Vietnam”), illustrate how they are almost as
belonging in China.99 The name suggests the notion that, although they were Vietnamese citizens,
the refugees were previously like ex-patriots of China living in Vietnam that have returned home.
Some Vietnamese left for China voluntarily and others were pushed out by the Vietnamese
government.100 They became famously known around the world as the “boat people” noting their
typical mode of transportation across the South China Sea to the coast of China. Once in China,
the refugees lived in refugee camps only for a short period of time and were quickly brought to
new homes and offered permanent status.101 Most of the Vietnamese refugees were brought to
live on state-farms in rural Guangxi Province. 102 Within a few years of arrival, groups of
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refugees developed successful businesses in the city of Beihai in Guangxi Province, many with
export contracts to Hong Kong.103 In the mid-1980s, it was reported that many of those that
became business people, as well as those who worked as farmers in the rural areas, earned
salaries of $4,000 USD per year, which was higher than the average Chinese salary at that
time.104
However, other reports published in the late-1980s did not paint as flowery a picture of
life for Vietnamese refugees in China. In 1987, the Associate Press reported that Chinese
authorities had stopped more than 4,000 Vietnamese refugees from leaving China and called the
need to stop the flow of Vietnamese refugees out of China “a matter of the utmost
importance.”105 Refugees leaving China complained that the quality of their farmland was poor
and that it was difficult to find better paying jobs.106 It might be the case that these particular
refugees never intended to stay in China and viewed it as an intermediate destination from which
they would continue on to a third country, such as Hong Kong or a western nation. Nevertheless,
the experience of Vietnamese refugees in China was arguably successful. In March 2006,
UNHCR Commissioner Antonio Guterres called the integration of Vietnamese refugees into
Chinese society “one of the most successful integration programs in the world.” 107 Although
these refugees that have now resided in China for several decades still do not have full Chinese
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citizenship, they do enjoy much of the same benefits as Chinese citizens and are sometimes even
issued Chinese passports by local authorities.108

Part III: The Kachin Conflict
To consider the reasons behind and implications of China’s treatment of ethnic Kachin
people in Yunnan Province, it is important to understand the background of the current conflict
in the Kachin State of Myanmar. Myanmar is a country located in Southeast Asia, which borders
China, India, Thailand, and Laos. The country was governed under British rule for 62 years, as a
part of the Indian Empire and then as a separate colony, until it became a sovereign nation in
1948.109 Today, sixty eight percent of people in Myanmar belong to the Burman ethnic group,
but the country has many different ethnic minorities, including the Kachin.110 The Kachin people
live in the northeast Kachin State of Myanmar, one of the country’s seven states. In 1947, the
Kachin minority group, together with other ethnic groups in Myanmar entered into the Panglong
Agreement with the Myanmar government, which promised ethnic Kachins a semi-autonomous
Kachin State in northwestern Myanmar.111 However, this promise never materialized, which led
to the original conflict between the national government and the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO), together with its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA).112 The
fight continued until a ceasefire agreement was reached in 1994.113
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In 2012, reforms to Myanmar’s government prompted the U.S. and other nations to lift
economic sanctions against the country, but freedom of expression continues to be highly
restricted.114 In Myanmar’s recent elections, the Kachin people were not able to form a political
party.115 After a 17-year-long truce between the Myanmar Army and the KIA, fighting resumed
in 2011. 116 Some reports have attributed the recent conflict to tensions caused by Chinese
investments in the region, including a large dam project that displaced over 12,000 ethnic
Kachins, who were forcibly relocated to Chinese-built villages.117 Other reports have claimed
that the breakdown of the agreement occurred after the government pressed the KIA to merge
with the national army or to disarm.118 However, representatives of the KIA have claimed the
resumed fighting is in response to war crimes committed against civilian Kachins and the
continued oppression of the Kachin people.119 Although Myanmar President Thein Sein said the
national army would only act in self-defense, jet fighters were sighted targeting the KIA in early
2012 and the Myanmar Army has reportedly been moving toward the KIA headquarters in Laiza,
a town near the Chinese border.120 There have also been reports of KIA attacks on non-military
targets, including passenger trains.121 Similar claims against the national army have been made
by an organization called Free Burma Rangers, based in Chiangmai, Thailand, which posted a
video of national helicopters shooting into a KIA area.122 President Thein Sein’s office defended
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the strike by stating that the KIA had attacked government convoys in that area.123 Since the
ceasefire between the KIA and the national Burmese Army ended in 2011, over sixty villages
that were previously inhabited by ethnic Kachins have been burned.124 Peace talks between the
Myanmar government and the KIA were facilitated by the Chinese in early 2013, but the most
recent meeting on March 10, 2013 resulted only in an agreement to proceed with further
negotiations of a ceasefire. 125 Although aid workers in Myanmar have reported a lessening
appearance of violent conflict, it is unclear when a ceasefire will be reached. 126 The KIA
demands political dialogue before agreeing to a ceasefire and the Myanmar Army demands a
ceasefire as a precursor to any political conversations.127

Protecting Kachins
Displaced Kachins began fleeing to China in June 2011.128 Some crossed the border at
unsecured points, which is typical in daily economic activities on the border.129 Many of these
people went to stay with friends, relatives, and other Chinese nationals who graciously provided
them with shelter. Human Rights Watch issued a report in June 2012 stating that Chinese
authorities had forcibly returned Kachins in Yunnan Province back to Myanmar, but the report
also stated that the Chinese government made concerted efforts to collect information about the
displaced Kachins and their needs.130 Although there are probably many Chinese people that
have sheltered displaced Kachins, who illegally crossed the border, there have been no reports of
arrests or detention of these individuals. Theoretically, anyone helping a Kachin residing
123
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illegally in China could be prosecuted under Article 318 of China’s Criminal Law. There have
also been no reports of arrests of individuals like Mr. Zhang, who illegally cross the border at
unsecured points to help bring supplies to Kachin people. Chinese authorities appear to be
unconcerned with these humanitarian efforts, or at least unaware, due to the lower priority the
issue holds or the newness of the situation.
While the Chinese government has not formally granted Kachin people, who have fled
Myanmar into China, refugee status, the establishment of refugee camps in Yunnan Province
indicates a stark departure from its approach to North Koreans entering into China through the
northeastern border. Conditions of these camps have been criticized by Human Rights Watch,
but no formal investigation by the UNHCR has been conducted. The Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson Hong Lei expressed the Chinese government’s view on the
displaced Kachins in Yunnan Province stating:
Since early this year, there have been military conflicts between Myanmar’s
military government and armed ethnic groups. Some of the [Burmese] have come
to China because of safety issues. They are not refugees. Moreover, they will
return to Myanmar as soon as the conflicts end. China has been providing
humanitarian aid to those people during their time in China.131
Human Rights Watch argued in favor of refugee status for these displaced Kachins in Yunnan,
stating that they fled human rights violations in Myanmar and returning to their homes would be
life threatening.132 UNHCR has not made any determination of their status, but has petitioned
China to grant Kachins temporary legal status in Yunnan. It is difficult for UNHCR to make a
full assessment of the situation because it currently lacks access to the camps in Yunnan, because
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China does not allow any foreign aid or media groups to provide coverage of the Kachin
refugees.133 On September 7, 2012, UNHCR spokesperson Adrian Edwards stated that:
Despite repeated requests to the Chinese authorities, UNHCR has not been able to
reach or assist these groups living along the Chinese side of the border. In midAugust this year, we started receiving reports of Kachins being sent back to
Myanmar, but were unable to confirm as we could not access the border areas.134
UNHCR has not been able to investigate the camps set up in China, but it was able to travel to
the village of Lwe Je in the Kachin State of Myanmar, near the Chinese border.135 In Lwe Je,
UNHCR reported stories from Kachin people that plain-clothed police officers removed them
from their shelters in China, loaded their belongings into trucks, and transported them back to
Myanmar. These returnees are now living in temporary camps in the Kachin State, as they fear
returning to their villages.136
To build a case for Kachin refugee status under the Refugee Convention, an argument
could be made on the basis of persecution of an ethnic minority group or as war refugees. The
Refugee Convention provides for the protection of individuals that are persecuted due to their
race, nationality, or social status. Evidence of the Myanmar government’s persecution of the
Kachin can be found its long history of depriving the Kachin people of representation in the
government, freedom to express their political opinions, broken promises of autonomy, and
targeting ethnic Kachins with crimes of abduction, rape, and murder. Individuals fleeing war are
not generally granted refugee status unless they can demonstrate a well-founded fear of
persecution and an inability or unwillingness (as a product of their fear) to avail themselves of

133

YANG, supra note 80.
Adrian Edwards, UNHCR Reaches Kachins sent back from China, UNHCR (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.unhcr.org/5049cdba9.html.
135
UNHCR concerned about welfare of Kachins sent back from China, UNHCR (Sept. 7, 2012),
http://www.unhcr.org/5049e42b6.html.
136
Id.
134

24

the protection of the government in their home country. 137 Here, due to the fact that the
persecution of Kachins and crimes against Kachin people are being committed by the national
army, it is easy to argue that the Kachin are unable to gain necessary protection. Rape against
ethnic minority women in Myanmar was confirmed generally by pro-democracy leader Aung
San Suu Ki, who stated in 2011 that:
Rape is used in my country as a weapon against those who only want to live in
peace, who only want to assert their basic human rights. It is used as a weapon by
armed forces to intimidate the ethnic nationalities and to divide our country.138
The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand reported that from September 2012 to February
2013, twenty-six civilian Kachins had been injured or killed by artillery attacks by the Myanmar
Army.139 They also documented the rape of 64 women and girls by national troops.140 Another
non-profit organization, the Shan Women’s Action Network, which represents the interests of
women from Myanmar’s Shan ethnic minority has also reported numerous instances of rape by
members of Myanmar’s army.141
If the UN made a determination that Kachins in China meet the Refugee Convention’s
definition of a refugee, China, as a signatory party, would be obligated to accept Kachin refugees
and would be prohibited from returning Kachin people to the region in which their lives are
threatened. However, the UN has not made that determination and has instead petitioned China
to grant Kachins in Yunnan temporary legal status and allow them to stay until conditions are
safe enough to return to their homes in Myanmar. The request that China provide only temporary
137
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status to Kachins rather than permanent asylum might be due to an unofficial determination by
UNHCR that Kachins do not meet the criteria of refugee status or because they believe the
fighting in their villages will not continue long-term. Whether China’s deportation of Kachins in
Yunnan would establish a violation of the Torture Convention depends on a finding of
substantial grounds for believing that returned Kachins could be tortured in Myanmar. Although
returned Kachins continue to be displaced from their villages and live in overcrowded ICP camps,
their conditions probably do not meet the UN’s definition of torture. Based on this definition and
the observation of UNHCR representatives in Myanmar’s IDP camps, China is probably not
violating the Torture Convention by returning Kachins to Myanmar, though it could still be
found to be in violation of their obligations to accept Kachins under the Refugee Convention.

Part IV: China’s Interests
There is little room to doubt that China has been much more accommodating to Kachin
people in Yunnan than it has been to North Koreans, despite the more compelling case for
finding that North Koreans in China meet the UN’s definition of a refugee and that their
treatment in North Korea more clearly meets the definition of torture under the Torture
Convention. Article 3 of the Refugee Convention forbids a state from discriminating on the basis
of race, religion or country of origin when applying the provision of the Convention. 142
Additionally, neither group has experienced the hospitality with which China received
Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s. It is the position of this paper that China’s behavior can be
explained, but not justified, through an analysis of its economic and geopolitical interests in each
region. In light of China’s unbending approach to North Korean refugees, the government’s
somewhat relaxed dealings with displaced Kachin people coming into Yunnan Province suggests
142
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different priorities and interests in the southwest region. The crossing of North Koreans into
China has received serious attention from Beijing, whereas the Kachin influx to China was
handled by local authorities in Yunnan.143 This suggests that the Kachin situation is not as high
of a priority to Beijing. 144 If China were to decide to comply with the U.N.’s requests to
accommodate North Koreans and Kachins, its experience with Vietnamese refugees would serve
as a useful model of how to handle a refugee population.

Money and Stability in Myanmar
The current conflict in the Kachin State is not the first quarrel between Myanmar’s
national government and ethnic minority groups that has caused refugees to flee into Chinese
territory. Conflict between Myanmar’s government and the Kokang ethnic group resulted in
more than 37,000 refugees to flee to Yunnan Province.145 China has taken a similar position with
all the conflicts that have recently occurred near the China-Myanmar border to encourage peace
and resolution between the parties.146 It is the opinion of this paper that China’s approach is due
to its calculation that encouraging resolution, rather than solely backing the government, will
best support its economic interests in Myanmar. Many ethnic groups that oppose the national
government, or at least particular government actions, are well organized in Myanmar, such as
the KIO. Supporting the national government without encouraging dialogue between the KIO
and Myanmar’s government would not be likely to yield quick peace or stability in the region.
China’s interests in the Kachin State are particularly important for the economy of Yunnan
Province. Community ties are strong on the Yunnan Province-Kachin State border, as Kachins in
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Myanmar and Jingpo people in China belong to the same ethnic minority group. Many Chinese
nationals live on the Myanmar side of the border to conduct trade and Kachin people often cross
into China for daily errands and business.147
China has many economic investments in the northwest region of Myanmar, which it
may not want to disrupt by harshly sending back all Kachins that have fled to China. Myanmar is
rich in natural resources and China’s strategic position and long political friendship with the
country present many opportunities for Chinese state-owned enterprises. 148 For example, the
conflict in the Kachin State has caused China to suspend the construction of a dam on the
Irrawaddy River called Myitsone. The plan is unpopular among many people in Myanmar for
environmental reasons and is seen by many as being exploitative of Myanmar’s resources. Over
90% of the electricity generated by the Myitsone would have been sent to China.149 In order to
proceed with building the dam, China would need to renegotiate and gain the support of several
groups in Myanmar, including the Kachin.150 Another strategic Chinese investment in Myanmar
is an oil and gas pipeline project that would provide China with more direct access to the Indian
Ocean and therefore reduce China’s dependency on shipping oil from North Africa and the
Middle East through the Malacca Strait.151 Construction of the pipelines began in 2010 and they
are designed to transfer 22 million tons of crude oil from North Africa and the Middle East and
an additional 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas from offshore gas fields near Myanmar.152
This project will be a large energy source for China and will lessen its dependency on coal.
Stability in Myanmar is of great importance to the success of these investments.
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Provoking the Regime
In a 2007 article, the New York Times suggested that if the U.S. assured China that it
would only be a “way station” for North Koreans to relocate to other countries, Beijing’s fears of
an influx of refugees would vanish and the situation would improve.153 However, this hypothesis
assumes that avoiding a refugee population is China’s main motivation for its repatriation policy.
Of course, its own soaring population is a concern to China, but the influence of its relationship
with the North Korean government should not be ignored or understated. In regard to China’s
interests in maintaining its repatriation policy toward North Koreans, Zhu Feng, a national
security expert and professor at the prestigious Peking University in Beijing, commented that,
“The problem is that if China refuses to repatriate, that would signal that Beijing wants to bring
down the North Korean regime.”154 In 1986, China entered into an agreement with North Korea
to prevent illegal border crossings called the Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of
Maintaining National Security and Social Order and the Border Areas.155 China claims that this
bilateral agreement with North Korea supersedes any obligation it has under an international
treaties.156
There could be many reasons why China prefers to maintain its status quo relationship
with North Korea. Although during the time of Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong, China and North
Korea shared many similar political and ideological values, today, even the Chinese government
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appears to view North Korea as a loose cannon that must be contained.157 While sharing a border,
it serves Chinese interests of peace and stability in the region to avoid provoking its
unpredictable neighbor. After North Korea conducted nuclear and missile tests in February 2013,
China began to take a stronger hand in enforcing UN sanctions.158 Inspection of cargo headed to
North Korea has become more rigorous in Chinese ports and cities. 159 Other than this small
improvement, China’s approach to North Korea does not seem to be changing, even though the
relationship does not appear to be symbiotic in anyway. North Korea repeatedly ignores China’s
advice not to threaten the United States, South Korea, or Japan with nuclear weapons.160 The
Chinese government provides a significant amount of food, fuel, and funding to North Korea, but
the regime has little to offer China in return. It appears that North Korea is like an unpredictable
friend that China perpetually placates, while in the meantime, conducting diplomatic damagecontrol each time North Korea makes a nuclear threat. It is the opinion of the paper that China
continues its repatriation of North Korean refugees, in part, for the same reasons it participates in
every other song and dance with the North Korean regime— that provoking the leadership or
destabilizing the North Korean economy could result in the next world war right on China’s
border and/or a flood of refugees into Chinese territory. If North Korea were to collapse, China
fears and political analysts predict that it would result in South Korea’s leadership over the entire
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peninsula, which is counter to China’s interests because it would mean that their immediate
neighbor is a nuclear-armed U.S. ally.161

Part V: Looking Forward
The UNHCR has already requested China to accept displaced Kachins from Myanmar
and allow them to obtain a temporary legal status in China until they are able to safely return to
their villages. These requests were made recently and there have been no public reports
evidencing China’s compliance. Still, the Chinese government is probably less concerned about a
huge influx of Kachins entering Yunnan Province than it is about the high number of North
Koreans that would enter into China if North Korea were to collapse. Also, China’s previous
accommodation of Kachins in IDP camps may indicate at least a possibility of willingness to be
cooperative. Authorities in Yunnan sent back groups of Kachins and this received international
attention. Over the span of decades, Kachin people have clung onto and fought for their
autonomy and representation in the government of Myanmar. History indicates they are a group
of people that are proud of and attached to the region they call home. It appears the Kachin
people are not seeking to permanently relocate to China and the UNHCR has noted that it is
preparing for voluntary repatriation of these refugees. However, many are currently still fearful
of returning to their villages. Taking these factors into consideration, it would behoove China to
continue to accept displaced Kachins and grant them temporary status, as requested by the
UNHCR. Reducing the volume of people in Myanmar’s internally displaced persons camps
would protect more Kachin civilians and might help to facilitate resolution of the conflict. Peace
between the KIA and the Myanmar government is essential to the continuation of Chinese
energy projects in the region, as is the support of the Kachin Independence Organization.
161
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Turning away displaced Kachins is not likely to help the Chinese resume construction of the
Myitsone Dam and might even cause the amount of Chinese dollars already invested to be
wasted if the project is permanently suspended.
China’s struggle with North Koreans fleeing famine and the persecution of their
government has persisted for over two decades. During this time, China has consistently returned
discovered refugees to North Korea, as per its agreement with the North Korean government.
There are some issues, such as limiting North Korea’s use of nuclear weapons, which behoove
China to take a strong position with the North Korean government. However, given China’s own
record, remedying human rights violations has not been at the top of Beijing’s agenda with its
eastern neighbor. Along the same line, given the increasing severity of North Korea’s statements
of nuclear threat toward South Korea and the United States, the international community’s
priority of putting pressure on China to use its influence to contain these threats is probably
much greater than the current concern of China’s repatriation of North Korean refugees.162 The
United Nations is, however, taking forward steps to address human rights violations in North
Korea and petition China to enforce UN sanctions. On Thursday, March 21, 2013, the UN
formed a committee to investigate human rights in North Korea.163 It is the first time that such an
inquiry has been made, but whether it will deal with China’s repatriation of North Korean
refugees is unclear at this time.164
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China’s concerns in Myanmar versus North Korea are as far apart as the regions are in
miles. It is befitting to China’s economic interests in Myanmar to encourage resolution between
the Kachins and Myanmar’s government. The conflict in the Kachin State is occurring between
the KIA and the Myanmar Army, with civilian Kachin casualties. Considering the current
domestic climate in Myanmar, China would not find success in supporting Myanmar’s national
government to crush opposition without dialogue. North Korea on the other hand, has all power
and force concentrated in its capital, Pyongyang. There is no visible conflict between the people
and the North Korean government, only the regime’s unilateral abuse of the people. From a
Chinese perspective, the current state of affairs in North Korea probably encourage China to
support its agreements with the testy North Korean regime and use its influence in select battles.
With the world watching both regions, lifted sanctions by western countries in Myanmar, and
nuclear threats from the North Korean government, there is always a possibility that China will
move closer to conforming to requests from the international community to accommodate
Kachins and North Koreans in China. Still, human rights almost always take a second seat to
national security and China understandably perceives a destabilizing or angered North Korea as a
huge national and regional security issue.
If China were to accept North Korean refugees into its territory, its strategic approach to
dealing with the large influx of Vietnamese refugees several decades ago would serve as a useful
model. These Vietnamese refugees were able to establish a new life in China and become
productive members of society. The lack of shared ethnicity between the Chinese Han majority
and North Koreans should not alone cause China to be any less welcoming of North Korean
refugees. Despite these recommendations, China’s past approach in the two regions remains the
best prediction of how it will continue to protect its interest in Myanmar and North Korea. As
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current nuclear tensions in North Korea and the conflict in the Kachin State of Myanmar develop,
the world will watch and China will have the opportunity to fulfill its obligations under its
international treaty agreements, protect those that come to the aid of the helpless, and once again
exhibit their ability to effectively receive a refugee population.
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